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Experiments have made important contributions to our
understanding of human behavior, including behavior relevant
for understanding social-ecological systems. When there is a
conflict between individual and group interests in social-
ecological systems, social dilemmas occur. From the many types
of social-dilemma formulations that are used to study collective
action, common-pool resource and public-good dilemmas are
most relevant for social-ecological systems. Experimental studies
of both common-pool resource and public-good dilemmas have
shown that many predictions based on the conventional theory
of collective action, which assumes rational, self-interested
behavior, do not hold. More cooperation occurs than predicted
(Ledyard 1995), “cheap talk” increases cooperation (Ostrom
2006), and participants are willing to invest in sanctioning free
riders (Yamagishi 1986, Ostrom et al. 1992, Fehr and Gächter
2000, Chaudhuri 2011). Experiments have also demonstrated a
diversity of motivations, which affect individual decisions about
cooperation and sanctioning (see Fehr and Fischbacher 2002 and
Sobel 2005 for reviews, and Bowles 2008 for policy implications).  
In early experiments, the resource dilemma was typically
described as a static situation and the focus was primarily on
understanding the social interactions of participants under
different institutional settings, e.g., rules for communication,
punishment, and regulations. Most of these early experiments
involved a series of independent rounds and did not include
resource dynamics. In each round the participant faced the same
decision problem. These static setups allowed researchers to
observe and make inferences about how individual strategies,
social interactions, and group outcomes changed over time as
participants got more information about the behavior of the
others. A few early experiments include dynamics of the resources,
such as probabilistic destruction (Walker and Gardner 1992), and
the dependence of extraction cost on decisions in previous rounds
(Herr et al. 1992). These earlier studies, which focused on
common-pool resource dilemmas, demonstrated that dynamics
increased harvesting rates compared with the static setting.  
However, most of the early experimental designs did not include
important aspects of some of the challenges experienced by real
resource users. For example, these designs often failed to capture
how the biophysical context affects the spatial and temporal
dynamics of the resource, the visibility of actions by others, and
the power relationships between actors. Thus, an institutional
arrangement that works effectively for one resource problem
might be a dismal failure if  applied to another resource problem
(Acheson 2006). For example, factors such as whether the
resource units are mobile (e.g., fishery, pastoralism) or whether
infrastructure is developed to guide the resource flow (e.g.,
irrigation systems) have been identified as important attributes of
resources affecting behavior in these dilemmas (Schlager et al.
1994, Janssen et al. 2007). This indicates that an understanding
of human behavior in social dilemmas needs to include not only
relevant aspects of relationships among humans, but also how
people interact with the temporal and spatial dynamics of the
resource.  
In recent years, there has been an increased effort to address this
issue with controlled experiments that incorporate relevant
ecological characteristics of these social-ecological systems
(Janssen et al. 2010, Knapp and Murphy 2010, McAllister et al.
2011, Cárdenas et al. 2013, Kimbrough and Wilson 2013). In this
new generation of experiments, there is a specific emphasis on
including various relevant additional complexities of the social-
ecological context, such as thresholds, disturbances, asymmetries,
and spatial heterogeneity. This Special Feature brings together a
collection of research papers that provides an overview of this
emerging field. The collection comes from a workshop on this
topic held at Arizona State University in March 2013. The papers
present an overview of the findings of experiments held in both
the lab and the field.  
The authors of the papers in this Special Feature have
backgrounds in various disciplines, including ecology and
economics. This interdisciplinary nature of the scholars has led
to new designs and different types of software used to run
experiments. Janssen et al. (2014) reviewed a number of
experimental platforms relevant for scholars who want to use
experimental methods for the study of social-ecological systems.
Platforms differ in their ability to include complexity and the user-
friendliness to implement and run experiments. Some platforms,
including pencil and paper, can be used to run basic experiments,
but the inclusion of more complex ecological dynamics requires
specific software for which more sophisticated programming
experience is needed. Janssen et al. provided a detailed set of
criteria that may help future experimentalists to decide which of
the platforms to use.  
We first discuss a series of papers using laboratory experiments
that included different ways to increase relevant social and
biophysical complexity. Hillis and Lubell (2015) present an
intergenerational public-good experiment in which groups were
not independent. Based on the notion of cultural transmission,
at the start of the experiment the group members received advice
from earlier groups who had played the experiment. Furthermore,
at the end of the experiment they were allowed to leave advice for
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future groups. Besides varying whether groups could leave
messages for future participants and receive messages from those
who have already participated, treatments also varied whether
they could communicate within the experiment itself. The results
showed that the combination of communication during the
experiment and intergenerational messages led to substantially
higher levels of cooperation compared with no communication
and no messages.  
Kreitmair (2015) also used a public-good experiment in which
participants could voluntarily share information about their
actions. She found that voluntary information sharing led to
higher levels of cooperation than both a no-disclosure baseline
and mandatory information disclosure. The voluntary disclosure
of information may be particularly useful when enforcement is
costly.  
Schill et al. (2015) studied a common-pool resource dilemma and
varied another component of the experiment, namely, the
ecological dynamics of the resource. They looked at a resource
that can experience regime shifts in productivity, depending on
the level of extraction. In all treatments, participants were able to
communicate with each other at any time, not just between rounds,
as is common in many experiments. Their results suggested that
the higher the probability of such a latent shift, the more likely
the group was to be cautious. The groups had higher levels of
collective action when risks were higher.  
Cherry et al. (2015) studied the effect of shocks on the willingness
of participants to share resources with the affected individual.
The experiment was inspired by many situations in Arctic
communities where individuals can lose their resource because of
external events. Cherry et al. found that even without a
commitment to pool resources, participants voluntarily pooled
risk, thereby reducing the variability of individual earnings.  
Baggio et al. (2015) found that higher risks did not have a major
impact on the decisions of participants. They studied irrigation
dilemmas in which participants had asymmetric access to
withdraw from the common resource while every participant
could make a contribution to the production of the resource.
Unlike participants in the Schill et al. (2015) experiment,
participants in Baggio et al. (2015) experiment could not
communicate, which might explain the lack of change in collective
action for different levels of risk. Baggio et al. (2015) showed the
importance of trust and inequality in explaining the observed
actions of the participants. Those with higher trust levels invested
more in the public infrastructure, and if  the inequality of
extractions in the group was not higher, the investment levels
would not drop.  
Like Baggio et al. (2015), Pérez et al. (2015) also studied irrigation
dilemmas in which subjects could communicate. Communication
was allowed via the exchange of text messages, and they analyzed
the transcripts to determine the social roles participants played
during the experiment. The study showed that no single role, such
as a leader or a connector, was sufficient for a cooperative
outcome. Instead, they found that the combination of certain
roles determined whether the group was successful.  
Lab experiments are attractive in the sense that they provide the
researcher with a “clean test tube” that provides control over
contextual variables and facilitates causal inferences. Because
they are conducted with students as participants, various complex
designs are relatively easy and cheap to test. However, the
potential drawback of lab experiments is precisely that they use
student participants instead of “real” resource users (Cárdenas
and Ostrom 2004). To which extent experimental results can be
generalized beyond the lab is of course an important question
that has received much attention recently (e.g., Levitt and List
2007, Falk and Heckman 2009, Henrich et al 2010, Fréchette and
Schotter 2015, part IV). One way to address this question is to
run experiments in the field with nonstudent populations as
participants. Javaid and Falk (2015) conducted irrigation
dilemma experiments in irrigation communities in Pakistan.
Consistent with Kreitmar (2015), public information about each
user’s extraction decisions led to higher levels of cooperation.
Moreover, Javaid and Falk (2015) showed that external sanctions
reduced the efficiency of group outcomes.  
Bell et al. (2015) also performed irrigation experiments with
farmers in Pakistan and included interactions between surface
and groundwater supplies. They found that better information
about water flows reduced social disapproval, but it did not reduce
inequality among the participants.  
García-Barrios et al. (2015) described a set of role-playing
experiments they conducted with both farmers and academics in
Chiapas, Mexico. The experiment was a spatial game on land use
change, i.e., pastoralism and deforestation. The study found
differences in the social preferences between the two subject types.
The academics mainly focused on coalition formation, whereas
farmers were more competitive.
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